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Abstract 
The paper scrutinizes empirically on one hand the structural characteristics of the coopetitive 
networks of SMEs, on the other hand analyzes the effects of the coopetitive networks on 
economic development at nodal regional level. Altogether three Hungarian coopetitive 
networks were found and examined longitudinally embracing 127 entrepreneurs thus 127 
interviews and 127 questionnaires were conducted as well. The primary datasets were 
investigated by combining the methods of network science and spatial econometrics. The key 
findings show that the coopetitive networks determine significantly the new jobs creation and 
pay raise, in general, the accumulation of territorial capital.  
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Introduction 
 
The paper theoretically and empirically concentrates on scrutinizing the Hungarian 
coopetitive networks of SMEs (hereinafter coopetitive networks) and their effects on the 
regional economic growth. The coopetition has occurred as a new category in the terminology 
system of social sciences. It refers to the special dynamic interplay between same firms in 
which the competitors collaborate and compete with each other simultaneously so as to reach 
higher profit (Bradenburger-Nalebuff 1996, Czernek–Czakon 2016). By applying coopetition, 
the market automatisms do not disappear from economic structure, of course. The competition 
remains in hegemony in the economic setting but in only some place of business life the rivals 
collaborate to achieve effectively their purposes.  
Moreover, well-known fact that every coopetitive network has territorial extension so a 
territory which is covered by a network is has to be named as a nodal region (Thilenius-
Havila-Dahlin-Öberg 2016). Since economic networks, economic relationships and the 
territorial concentration of economic activities create nodal region, it must be scrutinized by 
combining toolkits of network science and spatial econometrics. Taken together, the paper 
thus describes impacts of the coopetitive networks on the economic development of nodal 
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regions (hereinafter: regions). Spatial extensions of the coopetitive networks are illustrated by 
maps in the paper. The paper is organized as follows.  
In the first chapter, on one hand the theoretical underpinning and empirical overviews of the 
SMEs’ networking is demonstrated and, on the other hand, short Hungarian socioeconomic 
background is presented as well. After that, I show how the network dataset is collected and 
analyzed. Fundamentally, three Hungarian coopetitive networks were mapped locating on (1) 
Tihany-Budapest, (2) Nyíregyháza and (3) Budapest including 127 entrepreneurs all together. 
The study combines quantitative and qualitative methods of the network science as well in 
order to understand deeply the architecture and impacts of the coopetitive networks in the real 
business life. Actually, interviews and questionnaires are conducted as well with every 
entrepreneur thus 127 sociological, semi-structured interviews and 127 questionnaires are 
studied. The last chapter deals with how the coopetitive networks have impacted on the 
Hungarian regional economic development.  
In the next theoretical chapter the paper demonstrates the functions of inter-firm relationships 
in the business life. After that, the focus of the paper is narrowed down analyzing the 
coopetitive network that is a new type of the business network.  
 
Theoretical underpinnings and empirical overviews  
Empirical results of the concept of territorial capital suggest (Jóna 2015) that the Hungarian 
regional economic growth and development have been determined by networking of the 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. At first time Hakansson (2015) concentrated on 
examining the evolving of the business networks theoretically and empirically, the basic 
information and characteristics of the entrepreneurial networks were mustered by him. 
Hakansson stresses that a firm is not ‘an island but a multiple system’ encompassing human 
being with emotion, regional past, traditions, special socialization, etc. It is clear, the 
entrepreneurial decisions, performances and the networking are defined by on one hand 
exogenous and endogenous assets and on the other hand regional proximities as well 
(Bernela-Levy 2015); these usually have to be taken into account by the regional economic 
analysis.   
Furthermore, as the network structure is analyzed intensively in the next chapters, the scale-
free architecture of network has to be understood adequately. Obviously, the random graph 
theory cannot describe the network scheme in the nature but the Barabási-Albert model can 
grab it highlighting that the real networks usually follow scale-free property (Barabási 2016). 
Fundamentally, the scale-free network structure can be defined as power-law degree 
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distribution. In principle, the degree distribution illustrates how often nodes occur with 
varying edges in a network. Simply put, usually one or only some nodes have a large number 
of connections in the network, in so doing, the most of agents have only a few links thus hubs 
(high degree nodes is called hub) are formed that guarantee the robustness and integration of 
the network. The power-law degree distribution system is usually evolved by preferential 
attachment automatisms referring to the more connected players, the more likely it is to 
receive new and new ties. Consequence of the scale-free network topology is that the 
robustness of network becomes high. More precisely, in the coopetitive network a focal firm 
is known by everyone in the network, playing cruical role in the allocation of information, 
organizing, coordinating and integrating the actors of network. Lastly, the dominant firm (the 
hub) is defined as the Achilles Heel of network of SMEs (Barabási 2016) since it is the main 
actor in the network.  
Significant close connection can be gauged between the business network and regional 
economic growth; it can be proved by not only conceptually but also by empirically as well. 
Tangible examples of the economic networking occur both the Silicon Valley and Hollywood 
(Cohen-Fields 1999); 80 percent of the Italian agricultural sector based on small family 
business and almost whole Danish economic structure bases on the networks of SMEs 
(Chetty-Partanen-Rasmussen-Servais 2014).  
As above mentioned, the driving force of the Hungarian regional economic growth is the 
networking of SMEs. However, establishment of private ownership companies was forbidden 
in the socialist area indicating private ownership companies did not exist formally and there 
were no networks of firms, of course (Kornai 2008). After the regime change the Hungarian 
local residents could establish firms but they did not have economic links and enough 
relational capital; SMEs were allowed to be formed but the SMEs networking was restricted 
on account of early wrong political and social experiences (Berend 1996). This multiple 
situation determined significantly both the fluctuation of entrepreneurship and the networking 
of SMEs. In a nutshell, after 1989 numerous enterprises were established in Hungary but 
these had to functionalize almost total alone because entrepreneurs did not believe in each 
other, the inter-firm nexus has not been configured easily. The social network of 
entrepreneurs has been specified by the communist heritages. The communism had been over 
but the socialist socio-cultural and personal effects have remained in the Hungarian patterns 
of connections.      
Notwithstanding, I managed to find three bottom-up, supply-oriented coopetitive networks 
that have been operating as real networks. 
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In the next sections the paper demonstrates how datasets of the three networks were collected 
and analyzed. Afterwards, the chapter of result on one hand characterizes above mentioned 
three Hungarian coopetitive networks and on the other hand explains how coopetitive 
networks impact regional economic growth.  
 
Method, database and the models of networks 
The primary network datasets were assembled as follows. Employing my informal friendship 
including so many enterprises I found four collaborating same firms. Firstly I fixed up and 
conducted interviews separately with them and after that I asked entrepreneurs for telling me 
who else belong to this informal network. By following snowball method, three bottom-up, 
coopetitive networks were revealed. Nevertheless, quantitative (questionnaires) and 
qualitative (sociological semi-structured interviews) methods were applied simultaneously in 
order to the characteristics of the coopetitive networks can be understood in-depth (Paula 
2015). Basically, the primary graph database includes 127 interviews and 127 questionnaires. 
In general, the questionnaire consists of basic information of firms such as postal code, street, 
house number of firm location, number of employees, annual income, etc., besides, the 
interviews map out the nature of links between rivals. The interviews lasted 110 minutes on 
average, the longest one is 4 and a half hours, the shortest one is 55 minutes. The dataset was 
mustered between April and September 2015.  
Nevertheless, the paper accepts statement that almost every coopetitive network has spatial 
extension thus toolkits of network science and spatial econometrics are needed to combine. 
The first coopetitive network is located from Tihany to Budapest (network of Budapest and 
Tihany: NTHBP), the second one exists in Nyíregyháza (network of Nyíregyháza: NNYH), 
and the last one is situated in Budapest (network of Budapest: NBP). NTHBP embraces 72 
firms, NNYH consists of 14 firms, and NBP includes 41 firms, all together (72+14+41=127) 
127 enterprises belong to the network model. In a nutshell, 𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑃 = {1,2,3…72} , 
𝑁𝑁𝑌𝐻 = {1,2,3, … 14}, and 𝑁𝐵𝑃 = {1,2,3, … 41}. Moreover, these have to be defined as 
disjoint sets, so 𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑃 ∩ 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝐻 ∩ 𝑁𝐵𝑃, meaning that the networks can be analyzed 
separately and compared to each other in the next sections.  
All of three unintentional coopetitive networks are regarded as unweighted and undirected 
graphs referring to the interaction is mutual among firms, nodes are in symmetric relationship.  
In this model: 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑃,𝑁𝑁𝑌𝐻,𝑁𝐵𝑃 = (𝑉, 𝐸),  where N is network, V are vertices and E is edge. 
In this case V means firms and E means link among firms. More precisely, the vertices mean 
premises of firms and the edge refers to coopetitive interactions between competitors.  
5 
 
The structural properties of the coopetitive networks are gauged by degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, the Duranton-Overman index, geodesic distance, 
average degree, small world, graph density, scale-free network topology and the large of 
network (Jackson 2016). The details can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Some calculations of the coopetitive network 
Name Formula Describe of formula 
degree 
centrality (𝐶𝐷) 
𝐶𝐷 =
∑ [𝐶𝐷(𝑛
∗) − 𝐶𝐷 − (𝑛𝑖)]
𝑔
𝑖=1
[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)]
 
𝐶𝐷(𝑛 ∗) is the highest degree, g 
expresses the number of players 
closeness 
centrality 𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶(𝑛𝑖) = [∑𝑔(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑛𝑗)
𝑔
𝑖=1
]
−1
 
it highlights that a firm has 
central position in the graph if a 
company can be accessed easily 
thus it can gather and distribute 
market information 
betweenness 
centrality 𝐶𝐵 
𝐶𝐵(𝑛𝑗) =
∑𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗)
𝑔𝑖𝑗
 
it expresses that those player 
has power in the graph who is 
located among numerous other 
actors, where i≠j, l≠j and  
𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗) expresses the number of 
the shortest edges between i and 
j 
Duranton-
Overman index 
[𝐾(d)-index] 
𝐾(𝑑) =
1
𝐸ℎ
∑𝑛𝑖=0 ∑ 𝑓 (
𝑔−𝑔𝑖,𝑗
ℎ
)𝑛𝑗,𝑒(𝑖,𝑗∈𝐸) , 
f is a Kernel function, h stands 
for the optimal bandwidth, i and 
j show the distance between 
firms 
clustering 
coefficient (𝐶𝑖) 
𝐶𝑖
=
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
 (𝐶𝑖) refers to ‘the extent to 
which one's friends are also 
friends of each other’ 
average path 
(AP) 
𝐴𝑃 =
∑𝑛𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
. 
 
small word 
(SW) 
𝑆𝑊 =
𝐶𝐿𝑡
𝐴𝑃𝑡
 
 
 
The qualitative dataset is elaborated by both the structured content analysis and qualitative 
input-output analysis. The dimensions of interviews are classified as follows:  
 introduction, 
 network evolution, 
 collaborating with competitors,  
 horizontal and vertical network structure, 
 business model, 
 the network effect on the income and establishing of new jobs. 
The next chapters provide insight into the empirical results focusing on the topology of three 
Hungarian coopetitive networks and effects of the coopetitive networks on the regional 
economic growth.   
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Empirical findings 
The coopetitve network between Tihany and Budapest 
Tihany has always been a typical ecclesiastical and historical middle-sized town in Hungary; 
it is located in a peninsula of the north-Balaton Lake approximately 140 km far from 
Budapest (capital of Hungary). The local society of Tihany can be called special too, 
consisted of few members of elite and a large number of citizens who had been living under 
the Hungarian average living standards (Horváth 2015). Nevertheless, this sad socio-
economic circumstance has been reshaped basically by a very successful entrepreneur of 
Budapest who was born in Tihany. He decided on establishing a new local market in Tihany 
where the poor local inhabitants could sell their old and handmade products, odds and ends, 
vegetables and fruits from home gardens etc. Put another way, because of the new local 
market overwhelming of unemployed local people started working at new market and became 
entrepreneur and taxpayer citizens, moreover, they have been able to sign on further 
unemployed people of Tihany. Spread of the local entrepreneurship and the new marketplace 
have led to eliminate both the poverty and regional inequalities. 
It has to be emphasized that the local market was formed in 2008 but the solvent demand 
missed therefore owner of new market managed to invite his VIP friends from Budapest so 
that they could purchase local residents’ productions and as a result the local market has 
expanded; relational capital of the owner has been converted into economic capital. As a 
consequence, some successful enterprises of Budapest have been interested in selling products 
at new market of Tihany so nowadays approximately 20% of the NTHBP come from 
Budapest. 
Indeed, the NTHBP has to be defined as an unintentional coopetitive network because its 
counterparts collaborate with each other in the field of mutual transportation of goods. Since 
the mutual transportation, a typical form of coopetition, prevails in the all three Hungarian 
coopetitive networks, the mechanisms of mutual transportation have to be demonstrated 
thoroughly at this point.  
Initially, members of the coopetitive network understood that the price of transportation 
(expenditure) can be reduced by mutual transportation. So, when products start running out, 
an entrepreneur (the focal firm of the network) books orders and musters the list of needed 
goods. Just as many trucks are used for transporting goods that is enough for delivering the 
ordered volume of products hence savings can be realized collectively. For example, in the 
NTHBP usually 57 tracks deliver goods for 72 firms thus the cost of transportation and 
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amortization of 57 tracks have to be paid by 72 enterprises. By sharing and reducing 
transportation cost, firms can save financial resources to establish new workplaces or to 
increase income of their employees.  
Arguable, the focal firm has core function in the coopetition in Hungary. The role of dominant 
firm (sometimes it is called broker by Pathak-Wu-Johnston 2014) can be identified adequately 
by scrutinizing architecture of the NTHBP. As Figure 1 shows, the NTHBP has scale-free 
property referring to that only one agent (namely the focal firm) in the network has a large 
number of coopetitive connections, conversely, numerous nodes have only a few coopetitive 
links. 
 
 
 Simply put, the dominant firm, owner of new marketplace, is known and trusted fully by 
everybody in the NTHBP but the entrepreneurs do not trust in each other. As already 
indicated, it is because on one hand these entrepreneurs have been socialized in distrustful 
milieu of communism, on the other the rivals’ relationships are not friendly. Therefore, the 
focal firm mediates among firms in the network and can build bridge among competitors; this 
hub is the Achilles Heel in the coopetitive network. It can be lighted by a part of an interview.  
 
‘I hate C. J. (name of an entrepreneur was mentioned) because she deceived me a lot earlier. 
We hate each other. But I know A. P. (name of focal firm of the NTHBP was mentioned) who 
also knows C. J. I know that mutual transportation always brings me huge profit but I cannot 
negotiate with her so A. P. manages transportation between us. A. P. is a really good man, I 
trust him. He asks me and C. J. what we need next weekend and these are transported for us. 
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Figure 1. The topology of the NTHBP
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But I never negotiate with C. J. but the mutual transportation works because A. P. helps and 
mediates between us! ’ (121st interview) 
 
Basically, the focal firm guarantees integration and robustness of the coopetitive network 
(Pachura 2010). Formally, the central firm organizes mutual transports so that price reduction 
and profit maximization can be reached by all entrepreneurs in the NTHBP. 
The NTHBP is defined territorially because it consists of 72 enterprises (57 from Tihany and 
15 from Budapest) but only some firms of Budapest have coopetitive nexus with enterprises 
of Tihany. More specifically, the NTHBP might be divided into two sub-graphs territorially. 
The first subgraph can be found in Budapest, another one is revealed in Tihany and the two 
sub-networks are integrated by the focal firm (red point in Figure 2) therefore the NTHBP 
become a connected network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Spatial extension of the NTHBP 
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Besides, the Table 2 indicates adequately the architecture of three coopetitive networks. 
 
Table 2. Some structural values of three coopetitive networks 
 N L 〈𝑘〉 𝐶𝐷𝐹 𝐶𝐵 𝐶𝐶 𝐾(d)-index D 𝐴𝑃𝑡 𝐶𝐿𝑡 𝑆𝑊𝑡 P 
NTHBP 72 1742 48,38 0,73 1,93 0,82 0,19 0,69 1,36 2 0,4264 1,6314𝑇−2,135 
NNYH 14 91 13 1 4 1 0,41 1 1 1 1 - 
NBP 41 431 21,02 0,64 1,11 0,71 0,23 0,53 1,44 2 0,2361 1,4871𝑇−2,018 
 
To date, the NTHBP possesses domestic and international reputation showing a large number 
of the elites, VIPs and celebrities have already visited to purchase and meet friends at local 
market. The solvent demand and urban milieu can be improved intensively and the NTHBP 
promotes to the value creation, values capture and value appropriation at regional level.  
 
The coopetitve network in Budapest 
Actors of the NBP sell wine establishing in 2008 and encompass 41 same firms. The 
unintentional coopetition of NBP was constituted for mutual transportation so the NBP 
similars to the NTHBP. A central firm of the NBP manages mutual transport thus wine has 
not been needed to transport separately so the rivals of the NBP could save price of fuel to 
invest in creating new workplaces (Thornton-Henneberg-Naudé 2015). Basically, partners of 
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the NBP compete fiercely on quality, price and value but collaborate in the sphere of mutual 
transportation simultaneously so it has to be called a dynamic coopetitive network. 
By dissecting architecture of the NBP, scale-free network topology can be found again. 
Dominant firm in the NBP is the Achilles Heel so robustness of the NBP is so high (see 
Figure 3).  
 
 
 
The NBP is determined territorially meaning that actors of the network locate in the 5th, 6th 
and 9th (the most developed) districts. Besides, the focal firm (red point in Figure 4) is situated 
in the 2nd district, the richest place of Budapest. In this respect, the Hungarian élite has 
prominent function in the regional economic development nowadays. Irrespective of salient 
tension, the NBP can functionalize because the central firm brings so strong cohesion power 
and high robustness in the entrepreneurial graph. 
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Figure 3. Topology of the NBP
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Figure 4. Spatial extension of the NBP 
 
 
Finally, the Marshall-Arrow-Romer specialization externalities (so-called the localization 
economies of scale) has been revealed on territory of the NBP because of coopetition. 
 
The coopetitve network in Nyíregyháza 
The entrepreneurs of NNYH sell perfumes, establishing with 14 members in 1993, so far the 
number of entrepreneurs has not been changed and the NNYH has been operating without any 
formal contracts. The NNYH can be named as very special coopetitive network due to rivals 
of the NNYH are Christians following strongly the dogmas of Church thus it should be called 
a closed coopetitive network. This closeness has to be explained by the religion since 
Christian entrepreneurs of the NNYH do not cooperate with non-Christians. The results of 
structured content analysis and qualitative input-output analysis of interviews suggest clearly 
that non-religious entrepreneurs attempted to engage in coopetition but the Christian 
entrepreneurs did not trust them. Nowadays, two coopetitive activities can be distinguished in 
the NNYH such as mutual transportation and allocation of market information.  
For the first time, the NNYH had scale-free property indicating a focal firm had been 
organizing mutual transportation and allocating market information among competitors. 
Notwithstanding, after a short time all rivals started cooperating with each other intensively in 
some fields of business life hence they did not need more dominant firm. The central firm 
disappeared because all entrepreneurs of the NNYH trusted in each other and could make 
coopetitive interactions. Trust-building of the NNYH has been motivated by mutual faith 
therefore the role of central firm was marginalized gradually and the NNYH became a 
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complete graph. In the complete network every actor is connected to every other actor; every 
entrepreneur has coopetitive interaction with every entrepreneur in the NNYH. In general, the 
NNYH might have become complete graph so quickly because its entrepreneurs have been 
Christians preferring reciprocal trust and respect as well.  
Indeed, the NNYH has been effective but a static and closed network with only 14 nodes it 
has not scale-free scheme. The complete graph (see Figure 5) determines functionalizes of 
network (Knieps 2015), on one hand the robustness of NNYH is relatively low, and on the 
other hand it works democratically as horizontal bonds emerged among them. 
 
Figure 5. Adjacency matrix of the NNYH 
𝑁𝑁𝑌𝐻 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Simply put, vertical competition and horizontal cooperation can be revealed and merged 
among rivals of the NNYH and these have brought financial success to them. The cooperation 
of rivals significantly contributes to appear the localization economies of scale (Marshall-
Arrow-Romer specialization externalities) on territories of the NNYH. 
 
The networks’ effects and regional economic development              
Now paper focuses on quantifying longitudinally how the coopetitive networks define 
trajectory of regional economic growth. To date, there is no standard spatial econometrics 
method how the effects of the coopetitive networks can be operationalized on regional 
economic development. In this vein, the paper now attempts to quantify network effects. In 
developed network model, the effect of the coopetitive networks on the regional economic 
development is defined by (1) pay raising and (2) new jobs creating (Boucher-Fortin 2016). 
Actually, the applied network model answers the question how and to what extent the 
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coopetition strategy defines the change of income and employment rate on a certain network 
territory.  
Basically, the gauging is divided into two components such as quantitative and qualitative 
ones (Thomason-Simendinger-Kiernan 2013). On one hand the quantitative research focuses 
on employment and income data of the networks, on the other hand the qualitative dataset 
depicts how the regional milieu and atmosphere have been shifted in studies phase.  
The sharp question is how the gross costs of pay rise (PR) and the gross costs of creation new 
workplace (NW) can be financed by saving (S) that comes from coopetitive activities. On one 
hand, the coopetitive activities of firms can be expressed by saving (S), and on the other hand 
PR+NW=GCRD where GCRD is the gross cost of regional development. On condition that 
𝑆 ≥ 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐷, then saving can finance absolutely the gross cost of regional development. Of 
course, if 𝑆 < 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐷, then S is not enough to cover GCD. Moreover, 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐷 =
𝑆
𝑁𝑊+𝑃𝑅
 where 
GCRD [0,1] shows what proportion the gross costs of pay rise and creation new workplace 
can be covered by saving. The global value of GCRD within a time period: ∑ 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑖=1 . The 
Figure 6 reports the longitudinal changing of GCRD, obviously, the NNYH is the most 
successful in savings.    
 
 
 
The Figure 6 demonstrates that in 2014 the 52.98% of pay rise and new job creation could be 
financed by the savings in the NNYH. Moreover, in same time the 45.83% of the regional 
economic development were covered by coopetitive accomplishment in the NTHBP. Lastly, 
the 46.47% of regional economic development could be financed by the coopetitive business 
0,06
0,16
0,26
0,36
0,46
0,56
Figure 6. What proportion can the gross costs of pay rise and creation 
new workplace be financed by savings? (%)
NNYH NTHBP NBP
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strategy in the NBP. It is clear that coopetition in the practice has provides economic 
possibilities so that firms could expand market or create new marketplace, raise income and 
improve employee rate.  
The quantitative data collection provides insight into the employment rate of three coopetitive 
network separately. According to the data, 136 new workplaces were created by savings of 
NTHBP, 54 new jobs have been established by coopetition actions of NBP and 94 new 
workplaces were constituted by the savings of NNYH in 2014. In brief, the coopetitive 
actions of rivals significantly contribute to the job creation.  
Interestingly, the influence of financial economic crisis of 2008-2009 was not strong on 
accomplishment of the coopetitive networks. The coopetitive capacities of NTHBP and NBP 
were picking up sharply while the coopetitive performance of NNYH was falling slightly 
under the period of economic crisis. Put another way, the coopetitive network effects were 
stable on the regional economic development irrespective of the global financial crisis.  
In parallel, the qualitative results show that the regional milieu and atmosphere were reshaped 
in Tihany. The local attitude has been changed and urban habit was emerging representing 
that local residents have started following modern life style meanwhile retaining their 
traditions and past simultaneously. In a nutshell, qualitative research findings demonstrate that 
the new local marketplace has been able to modify the conservative image in Tihany by 
forming a special mixed form of the modern and historical conventions with local folklore. As 
a whole, the coopetitive networks have a qualitative spillover-effect namely these contribute 
to the strengthening of the local social integration.  
 
Conclusion 
Entrepreneurs of the Hungarian coopetitive networks have already increasingly started 
understanding and exploiting both collaborative and competitive advantages thus contributing 
to the regional economic development directly. It means that relatively developed business 
culture has been appeared and evolved among the Hungarian small enterprises and 
competitors. In the practice, entrepreneurs of coopetitive network share risks, cost and market 
information in order to maximize their profit. On one hand, the localization economies of 
scale emerged on territories of the NBP and NNYH, and on the other hand the urbanization 
economies of scale revealed on territory of the NTHBP.  
Obviously, savings could be accumulated in every coopetitive network by coopetitive 
activities so as to be able to finance both creation of new workplaces and pay rising. In 
particular, the coopetitive networks of same local entrepreneurs have established peculiar 
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economic ecosystem and pleasant atmosphere through exploiting both local endogenous and 
exogenous assets as well.  
Finally, the accomplishment of coopetitive networks might provide a new message to the 
Hungarian regional policy and territorial planning. The local competitors can increasingly 
organize and contribute to the regional economic growth therefore activities of coopetitive 
network ought to be taken into account within a framework of the formal Hungarian regional 
economic development policy in the future. Formally, the economic sector and political 
stakeholders should collaborate more intensively with each other to strengthen the regional 
economic growth.  
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